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1

Case No. 20110842-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Respondent,
vs.
MILO SIMONS,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals from its opinion in State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, 262 P.3d 53
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction from its grant of
certiorari under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
After stopping the car in which Petitioner was a passenger, the officer
saw drug paraphernalia in the driver's door. Then, while his partner
watched the driver, the officer approached Petitioner, told him what he had
found, and asked Petitioner if he had anything on his person he needed to
know about. Petitioner confessed that he had a pipe in his underwear.
Did the officer's brief inquiry of Petitioner infringe upon his
Fourth Amendment rights?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,

*

Tf 9, 22 P.3d 1242. "The correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns
on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under

^

the appropriate standard of review." Id. A trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's
4
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,
f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed nondeferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard
to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,. f 11,103 P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

<

i

i
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i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Facts.
While patrolling SR-77 near Springville, Deputy John Luke and a
deputy he was training ("officer-in-training'') saw a car traveling 10 miles
per hour above the posted speed limit.

R92:4-5,17-18 (R49). When a

computer check also revealed that the car was uninsured, the deputies
made a traffic stop. R92:5,17-19 (R48). While Deputy Luke watched from
the passenger side of the vehicle, the officer-in-training spoke with the
driver.

R92:5,19-20,27-28 (R49-48).

Petitioner was sitting in the front

passenger seat, but Deputy Luke did not speak with him at that time.
R92:5,20,27-28.
After the officer-in-training finished speaking with the driver, the two
deputies met at the front of their patrol car. R92:21 (R48). Deputy Luke
then approached the driver and collected his driver's license and the vehicle
registration. R92:5,21-22,28 (R48). The driver was unable to produce proof
of insurance for the car, which had been borrowed. R92:5,22 (R48). While
speaking with the driver, Deputy Luke smelled no alcohol, but "observed
[other] signs of possible impairment," including watery, bloodshot eyes and
"very rapid speech and movement."

R92:6,20-23 (R48).

The driver's

"unusual" and "agitated" behavior continued while Deputy Luke returned
to his patrol car and conducted a computer check. R92:6,23 (R48).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When Deputy Luke reapproached the car after completing the
computer check, the driver thrust his face toward the window and blurted

^

out, "I'm not drunk, I haven't been drinking, look at my eyes/7 R92:6,22-23
(R48). At that point, Deputy Luke asked the driver to exit the car to perform

j

field sobriety tests. R92:6,23 (R.48). As the driver got out, Deputy Luke saw
in plain view chewed baggies in the door's side compartment. R92:7-8,2324,28 (R48). Recognizing the baggies as drug paraphernalia, Deputy Luke
retrieved them and verified that they contained "a white powder of a small
crystal residue" that was consistent with methamphetamine. R92:8,24-25,27
(R48). Deputy Luke then asked the officer-in-training to stay with the
driver while he spoke with Petitioner. R92: 8,25 (R48-47).

i

Deputy Luke told Petitioner that he "had found paraphernalia in the
car and asked him if he had anything on his person [he] need[ed] to know
about." R92:9,25 (R47). Petitioner immediately confessed that he had a pipe
in his underwear. R92:9 (R47). Deputy Luke asked Petitioner to shake the
pipe from his pants and when he did so, a glass methamphetamine pipe fell
to the ground. R92:9 (R47). The deputies then arrested the driver and
found methamphetamine on his person in a search incident to arrest. R92:911,26. Thereafter, Petitioner volunteered that he had "some" in his pocket
and he surrendered a baggie of methamphetamine. R92:10-12,26 (R47).
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{

B. Summary of Proceedings.
Petitioner was charged with possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia.

R.6-5.

He moved to suppress the

evidence seized during the stop, arguing that the question posed to him by
Deputy Luke was beyond the stop's permissible scope. R.35-24. The district
court denied the motion, ruling that the question was justified because the
driver's possible impairment and the drug paraphernalia evidence created
"a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car." R.4946 (Addendum B).

Petitioner thereafter pled guilty to possession of

methamphetamine, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress. R.72-71,69-58. Petitioner was sentenced to a suspended prison
term of up to five years and placed on supervised probation for 36 months.
R.90-88.
Petitioner timely appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See
Simons, 2011 UT App 251. The court did not address the district court's
ruling that reasonable suspicion justified the deputy's inquiry to Petitioner.
Citing Arizona v. jofatson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), the Court of Appeals instead
held that the deputy's inquiry "did not measurably extend the length of the
traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable."
Simons, 2011 UT App 251, f l l .
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i

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence

i

seized from his person during the traffic stop. It correctly ruled that the
facts known to the officer supported "a reasonable suspicion and concern
about both occupants of the car/' justifying the deputy's brief inquiry of
Petitioner. R47. The Court of Appeals did not address the trial court's
i
ruling, but affirmed on alternative grounds. It held that "the question did
not measurably extend the length of the traffic stop or render the overall
duration of the stop unreasonable." Simons, 2011 UT App 251, Tfll. This
Court may affirm on either ground.
The police may extend a detention for additional questioning if the

i

facts and circumstances create reasonable suspicion of further criminal
activity. The trial court correctly concluded that the deputy's question was

-

supported by new reasonable suspicion. Chewed baggies of meth were
discovered in the side compartment of the driver's door and the driver
<

appeared to be impaired on something other than alcohol. Where Petitioner
was traveling with the driver, Supreme Court precedent makes clear tnat it
<

is reasonable for an officer to infer that both driver and passenger are
engaged in a common enterprise —in this case, the possession or use of
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drugs. This easily satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard for additional
investigative questioning.
The Supreme Court has further held that a passenger's belongings in
a car may be searched under similar circumstances. The Court has also held
that where drugs are found in the backseat of a car and the vehicle's
occupants deny ownership, probable cause exists to justify the arrest of all
occupants, including the front seat passenger.

Where the discovery of

contraband in a car justifies an officer's search of a passenger's belongings,
and even the arrest of the passenger, the officer may surely question the
passenger about contraband.
In any event, the deputy's question to Petitioner did not convert the
otherwise lawful encounter into an unlawful seizure, nor did it prolong the
detention beyond the time reasonably required to fulfill the deputy's
legitimate mission. The single question posed occurred in the midst of the
lawful stop and could not have lasted more than a second or two.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the question "measurably extended" the
duration of the stop. Nor is this case like State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 229 P.3d
650, where the purpose of the stop had already been completed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
THE OFFICER'S SINGLE QUESTION TO PETITIONER DID
NOT EXCEED THE STOP'S PERMISSIBLE SCOPE

<

After Deputy Luke saw drug paraphernalia in the driver's door, he
briefly turned his attention to Petitioner—the front seat passenger —told

'

him what he had found, and asked if he had anything on him he needed to
know about.

R92:9,25. This question led to the seizure of drugs and

^

paraphernalia. See R92:9-12,26. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to
suppress the evidence and the court of appeals affirmed, but on alternative
i
grounds. This Court may affirm on the ground upon which the trial court
relied: The paraphernalia in plain view created "a reasonable suspicion and
concern about both occupants of the car/7 justifying the brief inquiry of
Petitioner. R47. Or, the Court may affirm on the ground upon which the
court of appeals relied: "[T]he question did not [in any event] measurably
extend the length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the
stop unreasonable/' Simons, 2011 UT App 251, Tfll.
* **

.

A traffic stop is a seizure of "everyone in the vehicle'''' and thus, ail
vehicle occupants are entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-58 (2007). Like any other seizure, a
traffic stop must meet two basic Fourth Amendment requirements. The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

stop must (1) be "lawful at its inception," and (2) be "executed in a
reasonable manner."

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).

The

lawfulness of the stop in this case is undisputed. The observed speeding
violation gave the deputies, at least, reasonable suspicion to warrant a stop.
See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the only
issue on certiorari is whether the stop was "executed in a reasonable
manner." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. It was.
A traffic stop is reasonable in its execution so long as the officer
"diligently pursue[s]" a course of action that is likely to fulfill the purpose
of the stop. See United States v. Slwiye, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The police
must end the stop and release the vehicle's occupants "when [they] have no
further need to control the scene." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333
(2009).

This normally occurs once the initial purpose for the stop is

concluded. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \31, 63 P.3d 650. But officers are
also allowed "'to graduate their responses to the demands of [the]
particular situation." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted). Accordingly,
"[i]f, during the scope of [a lawful] traffic stop, the officer forms new
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also
expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 13,
229 P.3d 650. The deputies in this case met this standard.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. The brief inquiry of Petitioner was justified by reasonable
suspicion of further criminal activity.
The traffic stop of Petitioner quickly, and properly, evolved into a
drug investigation, supported by not just reasonable suspicion, but probable
cause. After observing "signs of possible impairment" in the driver, but no
alcohol odor, Deputy Luke asked the driver to step out of his vehicle. See
R92:6,20-23. When the driver did so, the deputy saw "inside the door side
compartment in plain view . . . several baggies that had been chewed on."
R92:6-7. He immediately recognized the baggies as drug paraphernalia and
retrieved them from the door. See R92:8. This plain view discovery was
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that other contraband or
evidence might be in the car. See United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 690
(10th Cir. 2002) (holding that "if an officer has lawfully observed an object
of incriminating character in plain view in a vehicle, that observation, either
alone or in combination with additional facts, has been held sufficient to
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allow the officer to conduct a probable cause search of the vehicle").!
Petitioner conceded as much on direct appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 9.
But the facts, circumstances, and reasonable inferences in this case
established more. They supported, at the very least, a reasonable suspicion
that Petitioner also possessed contraband or was otherwise involved in
drug activity together with the driver. As explained by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the intrusion occasioned by a detention for investigative questioning
is "modest," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-80 (1975), and
"'surely less intrusive'" than a search. See Muehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93, 98
(2005) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981)). For this
reason, an investigatory detention is permissible if the officer's suspicion "is
supported by specific and articulable facts as well as any rational inferences
drawn from those facts/7 State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT 61, Tfl4, 147 P.3d 425
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

1

cPP

P

n,

ih.ii}-pr! S+n+PQ "7 A / r 7 , r ^

£on T: IA

This standard is "less

cue

Q O ^ /Q4-U r ^

omn\

(holding that discovery of crack pipes in a vehicle's console "would have
provided probable cause to search anywhere in the car, including in the
backpack, for further evidence of drug activity"); United. States v. Fladten, 230
F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that discovery of an item
"commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine" in plain view in
automobile provided probable cause to believe that "further contraband or
evidence may have been in the other parts of the automobile").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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demanding" than probable cause, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123
(2000), and was easily met here.
The facts and circumstances confronting Deputy Luke were these:
Petitioner was traveling in a car with "chewed" paraphernalia in plain view,
and with a driver who appeared to be impaired by something other than
alcohol. See R92:6-8,20-27,. Given these facts, Petitioner's presence in the car
and association with the driver made it "reasonable for [Deputy Luke] to
infer a common enterprise among the [two] men." See Maiyland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003). They "indicated the likelihood of [drug possession
or use], an enterprise to which a [user] would be unlikely to admit an
innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him." Id.
Petitioner challenged this argument below, contending that his "mere
presence" in the car did not support a reasonable suspicion that he was
involved in drug activity. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-16. But an examination of four
Supreme Court cases defeats that claim: United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948), Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S 85 (1979), Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295
(1999), and Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003).
United States v. Di Re
In Di Re, the Supreme Court addressed whether the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement includes the search of all occupants
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"when the contraband sought is of a character that might be concealed on
the person/' 332 U.S. at 584. In that case, Buffalo police officers stopped a
car based on an informant's tip that the driver was selling counterfeit
gasoline ration coupons at the identified location. Id. at 583. Both the driver
and his front seat passenger, Di Re, were taken into custody and searched.
Id. The search of Di Re uncovered two counterfeit coupons. Id. The
Supreme Court recognized that vehicle occupants "could be used to conceal
[such] contraband on [their] person," but declined to extend the automobile
exception to the "search of guests in a car." Id. at 587.
Ybana v. Illinois
Some 30 years later, the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue, but
in the context of a warrant search of a public tavern. In Ybarra, police
officers secured a warrant to search a tavern and one of its bartenders for
drugs based on information from an informant that the bartender was
selling heroin, which he kept in packets on his person and under the bar.
444 U.S. at 340-41.

When officers executed the search warrant, they

conducted patdown searches of the various customers present at the bar,
one of whom was Ybarra. Id. at 341. The search of Ybarra uncovered
several packets of heroin. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the
patdown search of Ybarra was not justified. Id. at 90-91. The Court held
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that "a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to
search that person/' Id. at 91.
Wyoming v.Houghton
In Houghton, decided two decades later, the Supreme Court addressed
a somewhat different

question—whether

the automobile

exception

embraces the "search [of] a passenger's personal belongings inside an
automobile." 526 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). After making a traffic stop,
the officer in Houghton observed a syringe in the front pocket of the driver,
who then admitted using it to take drugs. Id. at 298. Officers ordered the
driver and his two female passengers — one of whom was Houghton—out of
the car. Id. Even though the only evidence of criminal wrongdoing was
found on the male driver's person, officers searched Houghton's purse in
the backseat and found a syringe containing methamphetamine.

Id.

Relying on Di Re and Ybarra, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
automobile exception did not extend to the passenger's belongings. Id. at
299,303. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 299-307.
In reversing, Houghton distinguished Di Re and Ybarra. The Court
observed that "a car passenger —unlike the unwitting tavern patron in
Ybarra — will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and
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have the same interest in concealing the fruits of the evidence of their
wrongdoing/' Id. at 304-05. It also recognized that a driver "might be able
to hide contraband in a passenger's belongings/7 Id. at 305. The Court thus
held that "'[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that
may conceal the object of the search/'7' including a passenger's belongings.
Id. at 301-02 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982))
(emphasis supplied in Houghton).
Although contraband may be concealed as readily on a passenger's
person as among a passenger's belongings, Houghton did not overrule Di Re.
The Court noted that Di Re " turned on the' unique, significantly heightened
protection afforded against searches of one's person." Id. at 303. The Court
reasoned that the search of a passenger's person is not justified under the
circumstances because "the degree of intrusiveness upon personal privacy
and indeed even personal dignity . . . differ substantially from [a] package
search." Id. at 303. The Court concluded that the search of a passenger's
belongings is justified because the "traumatic consequences [of a patdown
search] are not to be expected when the police examine an item of personal
property found in a car." Id.
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Maryland v.Pringle
Finally, in Maryland v. Pringle, the Supreme Court recognized that the
discovery of contraband in an automobile may support a probable cause
finding to arrest all occupants in the vehicle. In that case, a police officer
stopped a car occupied by three men—a driver, a front seat passenger
(Pringle), and a back seat passenger. Id. at 367-68. During the course of the
stop, the officer discovered more than $700 in rolled-up cash in the glove
box and five plastic baggies of cocaine behind the backseat armrest. Id. at
368. When no one would admit ownership, the officer arrested all three. Id.
at 368-69. Relying on Houghton, the Supreme Court held that because the
men "were in a relatively small automobile, not a public tavern/' the officer
reasonably "infer[red] a common enterprise among the three men." Id. at
373. The Court thus concluded that the front seat passenger's arrest was
justified because "the officer had probable cause to believe that [he] had
committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance." Id, at 37A.
***

The issue in this case involves the brief questioning of a passenger
(Petitioner), rather than the search of a passenger's belongings or person, or
the arrest of a passenger. But Pringle and Houghton are instructive. Like the
front seat passenger in Pringle, Petitioner and his companion "were in a
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relatively small automobile, not a public tavern/7 540 U.S. at 373. And, as
recognized in Houghton, it is reasonable in such cases to believe that the
passenger is "engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and [that
both] have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing."

526 U.S. at 304-05. Where an officer's discovery of

contraband in the backseat of a car satisfies the probable cause burden for
arresting a front seat passenger, Deputy Luke's discovery of chewed
paraphernalia in the driver's door certainly satisfies the "less demanding"
reasonable suspicion burden, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, that is required for
making the much "less intrusive" investigative query, see Mena, 544 U.S.. at
9.8 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Under Houghton, Deputy Luke would have been justified in searching
any belongings that Petitioner may have had in the car. And under Pringle's
rationale, he was likewise justified in at least asking Petitioner whether he
had anything he needed to know about. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Pringle implicitly recognized that when confronted with the discovery of
drugs in a car, officers may at least query passengers about the drugs. For
in Pringle, the officer "questioned all three men" about the drugs. Pringle,
540 U.S. at 368-69. And all three were justifiably arrested, in part because
they answered the officer's question and denied ownership. See id. at 372-73.
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B, In any event, the deputy's question to Petitioner did not
unreasonably delay the investigation.
Even if Deputy Luke's question to Petitioner was unmoored from the
legitimate, though evolving, purpose of the stop, it did not render his
detention unlawful.
As noted, for a traffic stop to be reasonable in its execution, officers
must act "diligently" to fulfill the purpose of the stop and may not
"unnecessarily prolong [the] detention." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86. "That
being said, officers are not required to use the least restrictive means
available in pursuing their investigation; the question is merely 'whether
the police acted unreasonably in failing to . . . pursue' alternatives." State v.
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 28, 164 P.3d 397 (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687).
After

all,

"the

'reasonableness.'"

Fourth

Amendment's

ultimate

touchstone

is

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398, 404 (2006).

Thus, when evaluating whether a stop was conducted in an improper
manner, "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over
rigid criteria." Sliarpe, 470 U.S. at 685.
After making a lawful traffic stop, an officer may, of course, ask the
driver and passengers "to explain [the] suspicious circumstances" that gave
rise to the stop. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882. Additionally, "an officer
'may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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check [to verify that information], and issue a citation" or warning. State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650. This activity is part and parcel of the
typical traffic stop. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding
that "when either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure
for violation of the law," an officer may "check [the motorist's] "driver's
license and the registration of the automobile").2
An officer may also run a warrants or background check on the
driver, "so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention
beyond that reasonably necessary" to fulfill the stop's initial objectives. See
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. Although not necessarily related to the purpose of
the stop per se, such checks are permitted "in recognition of the safety risks
confronting a police officer who makes a traffic stop." State v. Rodriguez,
2007 UT 15, \V7,156 P.3d 771. For this same reason, an officer may likewise
"run a background check of . . . passengers and, in addition,... order [both]
driver and passengers out of the vehicle." Id.

2

This is true unless, of course, the reasonable suspicion that justified
the stop is dispelled before the officer contacts the driver. See Morris, 2011
UT 40, f 25 (holding that an officer who loses reasonable suspicion before
contacting the driver may "offer an explanation," but "may not ask for
identification, registration, or proof of insurance at this time unless during
this brief encounter, new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
immediately arises that justifies further detention").
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The Supreme Court has also held that to be reasonable in execution, a
detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place/' Teiry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968); accord Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (same); State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40,1
15, 259 P.3d 116 (same); Baker, 2010 UT 18, |12 (same). Despite the Court's
use of absolute language, this limitation in scope is not a bar to any and all
officer activity unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop. As this Court
recognized in Worwood, unrelated officer action is permissible so long as it
does not

(1) "'represent ' any further

intrusion

on the

detainee's

[constitutional] rights,'" or (2) "'add to the delay already lawfully
experienced/" 2007 UT 47, ^[28,164 P.3d 397 (quoting State v. Chism, 2005
UT App 41, fl5,107 P.3d 706)).
When executing a stop, therefore, police cannot "change the level of
coercion . . . to the degree that it is no longer justified under reasonable
suspicion." Id. at ^[30. For example, police conduct may not "become so
intrusive that it escalates into a de facto arrest" without probable cause. Id.
at f 30. Nor may officers conduct a search for evidence absent an additional
showing of probable cause. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)
("insisting] upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a
reasonable search" for evidence in an automobile).

In each of those
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instances, the police conduct constitutes a " discrete Fourth Amendment
event" requiring independent justification. See Mena, 544 U.S. at 100-01.
In contrast, a mere "shift in purpose" alone does "not change the
character of a [lawful] traffic stop" into "a constitutionally cognizable
infringement." See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09. For example, an otherwise
lawful detention does not become unlawful by mere police questioning on
unrelated matters, see Mena, 544 U.S. at 100-01, nor, even, by deployment of
"a well-trained narcotics detection dog" that "'discloses only the presence
or absence of narcotics, a contraband item/ " Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (citing
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
On the other hand, "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in
issuing a warning [or] ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission."
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. The Supreme Court recently expounded on this
principle in Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
In Johnson, gang task force officers stopped the driver of a vehicle for
a registration violation. Id. at 327. While one officer spoke with the driver,
another officer spoke with Johnson—a backseat passenger—hoping to gain
intelligence about the gang Johnson might be in. Id. at 328. Johnson was
wearing clothing consistent with gang membership and had a scanner in his
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pocket, but officers "had no reason to suspect anyone in the vehicle of
criminal activity." Id. at 327-28. In response to the officer's questions,
Johnson said he did not have any identification, volunteered that he was
from a town the officer knew was home to a Crips gang, and revealed that
he had been in prison for burglary. Id. at 328. Based on these answers,
Johnson's clothing, and his possession of the scanner, the officer suspected
that he may be armed and frisked him. Id.
The Supreme Court addressed two questions: (1) whether a frisk for
weapons requires, as a prerequisite, reasonable suspicion that the suspect
frisked is involved in criminal activity, id. at 330-32; and (2) whether
questioning unrelated to the legitimate purpose of a stop renders the
detention unlawful, id. at 332-34. The Court's answer to the second question
is relevant to the question presented here.3
The Arizona court of appeals concluded that the officer's authority to
detain Johnson, and thus her authority to frisk him, ceased once she
"undertook to question Johnson on a matter unrelated to the traffic stop, i.e.,
3

In answering the first question, the Court held that assuming there is
reasonable suspicion the passenger is armed and dangerous, an officer may
frisk the passenger for weapons so long as "it is lawful for police to detain
an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular
violation." Johnson, 555 at 327. It held that "[t]he police need not have, in
addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal
activity." Id.
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Johnson's gang affiliation." Id. at 332. The Supreme Court flatly rejected
that conclusion. It held that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. at 333 (citing Mena, 544
U.S. at 100-01) (emphases added). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that
Deputy Luke's question to Petitioner was unrelated to the legitimate
purpose of the stop, that fact did "not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure." Id.
The State acknowledges that Deputy Luke walked a few feet away
from the driver and asked Petitioner whether he had anything the deputy
needed to know about. But that action could only have extended the stop
by mere seconds. Johnson held that unrelated questioning is permissible "so
long as [it] do[es] not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id.
(emphasis added). In other words, unrelated questioning that only extends
a stop incrementally, such as occurred here, will not render it unlawful. The
question is not whether the officer's actions extended the stop by a few
seconds or minutes, but whether it prolonged the stop "be)^ond the time
reasonably required to complete" its purpose. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. It
cannot be said on these facts that the question posed to Petitioner prolonged
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the stop beyond the time reasonably required to investigate the driver's
impairment or possession of paraphernalia.
Petitioner argues that under Baker (as well as the pie-Johnson cases of
Hansen and State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996)), any extension of
time during a stop, no matter how slight, renders it unlawful. See Pet. Brf.
at 8-26. But the Utah Supreme Court in Baker did not purport to overrule
Johnson, which deals with officer conduct during a lawful detention. Baker
instead addressed the propriety of extending a detention after the purpose
of the stop is fulfilled.

See Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 31 (holding that "any

detention of an individual after the purpose of the initial detention has
concluded violates the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added).
As conceded by Petitioner below, his continued detention was
justified while Deputy Luke "continued to investigate [the driver's]
sobriety," as well as the contraband possession, and thereafter "effectuated
his arrest, or issued a citation." Aplt. Brf. at 13. The allegedly unrelated
question posed to Petitioner during that time did not "measurably extend
the duration of the stop," Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, or otherwise prolong it
"beyond the time reasonably required [for Deputy Luke] to complete" his
lawful investigation, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted on June 14, 2012.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JEW&Y S. GRAY

sistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 14, 2012, two copies of the foregoing brief were
0 mailed • hand-delivered to:
Douglas J. Thompson
Utah County Public Defender Ass'n
51 South University Avenue, Ste. 206
Provo,UT 84601
Also, in accordance with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, a
Courtesy Brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf):
0 was filed with the Court and served on appellant.
• will be filed with the Court and served on appellant within 14 days.

o

—.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Addenda

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM A
State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251,262 P.3d 53

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Milo Simons,

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

Case No. 20080109-CA

)
)
)

FILED
(July 29, 2011)

)
Defendant and Appellant.

1 2011 UTApp 251 1

)

Fourth District, Provo Department, 061404283
The Honorable James R. Taylor
Attorneys:

Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for Appellant
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Before Judges McHugh, Roth, and Christiansen.
McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge:
fl
Milo Simons appeals from his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a
third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2010),1 arguing that a
police officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by impermissibly extending the
length of a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. We affirm.

because the relevant sections of the code have not changed, we cite to the
current version as a convenience to the reader.
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^[2
On the evening of October 21, 2006, Deputy John Luke was on patrol near
Springville, Utah, with another officer whom he was training when he observed a
vehicle traveling approximately ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. After a
computer check revealed that the vehicle was also uninsured, Deputy Luke initiated a
traffic stop. The officer-in-training made initial contact with the vehicle's driver.
During this initial encounter, Deputy Luke approached the vehicle from the passenger
side to observe the exchange. Simons was sitting in the front passenger seat, but
Deputy Luke did not speak with him at the time. The officers then met behind the
vehicle. After a brief exchange between the officers, Deputy Luke approached the
driver, as Deputy Luke would be the one actually issuing the citation if it were
determined that a citation was appropriate. Deputy Luke requested the driver's license,
registration, and proof of insurance. The driver explained that the vehicle was
borrowed and that he was unable to provide proof of insurance.
%3
Deputy Luke testified at the preliminary hearing that at this point, he observed
signs of possible impairment in the driver, including watery, bloodshot eyes, and rapid
speech and movement. Deputy Luke continued to observe "agitated" movements in
the driver after he went back to his patrol car to conduct a records check. When he
again approached the driver after conducting the records check, the driver "blurted out
. . . without being questioned" that he was not drunk, told Deputy Luke to "look at [his]
eyes," and "forced his face towards the window." Deputy Luke asked the driver to step
out of the vehicle because he wanted to conduct field sobriety tests. As the driver
stepped out of the vehicle, Deputy Luke observed, in the driver's side door
compartment, "several baggies that had been chewed on." Deputy Luke testified that
in his experience, he had only ever seen these types of baggies used to carry drugs and
he noticed "white powder of a small crystal residue inside" the baggies, which he
suspected was methamphetamine.
^4
Deputy Luke testified that after he found the baggies, he "had the assisting
officer just stand by with [the driver]" while he approached Simons, who was still
sitting in the passenger seat. He explained to Simons that he had found paraphernalia
in the car and asked Simons if there was "anything on his person [Deputy Luke]
need[ed] to know about." Simons immediately confessed to having a pipe in his
underwear. Deputy Luke then had Simons step out of the vehicle and shake the pipe
out of his pants, where it fell to the ground. After the officers searched the driver and
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placed him under arrest, Simons informed Deputy Luke that he also had
methamphetamine in his pocket.2
%5
Simons was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, see id. § 58-37a-5(l), and possession of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony, see id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Simons was bound over for trial following a
preliminary hearing. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the pipe
and methamphetamine, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his rights against
unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend. IV.3 The trial court denied Simons's motion,
concluding that the used condition of the baggies "coupled with the possible
impairment [of the driver] le[d] to a reasonable suspicion and concern about both
occupants of the car." Following the trial court's denial of his motion, Simons entered a
conditional guilty plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance,4 reserving
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, see State v. Sen/, 758 P.2d 935,
939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
16
Simons appeals, arguing that the evidence in this case should be suppressed
because Deputy Luke exceeded the permissible length and scope of the stop when,

2

Deputy Luke retrieved the bag from Simons's pocket and he testified that the
bag's contents were subsequently tested and identified as methamphetamine.
3

Simons also cites article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in arguing that
Deputy Luke's actions violated his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, because he has not argued for a separate analysis under the Utah
Constitution, we consider only Simons's federal constitutional claim. See State v. Bean,
869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[A]n appellate court can decline to address
state constitutional claims under article I, section 14 if the party fails to proffer any
explanation as to how this court's analysis should differ under this section from the
federal counterpart/ 7 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fourth Amendment to
the LTnited States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
4

In exchange for pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the State
agreed to dismiss the charge against Simons for possession of drug paraphernalia.
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without reasonable suspicion that Simons was engaged in any criminal activity, he
turned his attention from the driver to Simons and asked Simons if he had "anything on
his person [Deputy Luke] need[ed] to know about." When reviewing a trial court's
denial of a motion to suppress, we review the findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard, see State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 12,164 P.3d 397, and its legal conclusions
for correctness, see State v. Baker, 2010 UT 1 8 , i 7 , 229 P.3d 650. '"When a case involves
the reasonableness of a search and seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and
prosecutorial officials/" Id. (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 3 6 , f 1 2 , 78 P.3d 590).
Because we conclude that Deputy Luke did not exceed the permissible length of the
stop, we need not determine whether Deputy Luke's questioning of Simons was
supported by reasonable suspicion. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,113, 52 P.3d 1158
("[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." (emphasis and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
%7
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. "Although police must
have a warrant to conduct most searches and seizures, 'officers may temporarily detain
a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the
purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion.'" Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 11
(quoting State v. James, 2000 UT 8 0 , f 1 0 , 1 3 P.3d 576). Although "'one does not lose the
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile,'" id. (additional internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131 (Utah 1994)), the
"'automobile exception' to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a
lesser expectation of privacy 'due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly
regulated status,'" id. (quoting James, 2000 UT 80, f 10).
18
In order to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we apply a two-step test. See id. % 12. "The first step is to determine
whether the police officer's action [was] justified at its inception. In the second step, we
must determine whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Simons concedes that
Deputy Luke was justified in pulling the vehicle over for a speeding violation. See
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a
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vehicle if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence/'
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We now address Simons's contention that Deputy
Luke's conduct exceeded the scope of the traffic stop here.
f9
For the duration of a lawful traffic stop, "'[t]he temporary seizure of driver and
passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the s t o p / "
Baker, 2010 UT 1 8 , f 1 3 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009)). Unless
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause of further
criminal activity during the course of the traffic stop, "the officer must allow the seized
person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded." Id.; see also State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 31, 63 P.3d 650 ("Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of a further illegality." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). If, during the course of the traffic stop, police officers develop probable cause
to arrest the driver, the passengers may lawfully be detained until the arrest is
complete. See Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ \ 16,19. "At that time, officers must release any
passengers who were detained incident to the detention of the vehicle." Id. \ 19.
^10 During the course of an otherwise lawful encounter, however, officers may pose
questions to drivers and passengers unrelated to the scope of the stop without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so long as those actions do not measurably
extend the length of the stop. See Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at .788 ("An officer's inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter
into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably
extend the duration of the stop."). In making the determination of whether the stop has
been measurably extended, "[a] court should not micromanage the details of a traffic
stop to ensure that no actions of the police improperly extend the stop so long as the
duration of the stop is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." Baker, 2010
UT 18, \ 17. Instead, "[t]he reasonableness of a detention should be evaluated on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances facing the officer, not on judicial secondguessing." Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 28.
Ill
Although Simons concedes that Deputy Luke was entitled to detain him while
investigating his reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated and in possession
of the residue-filled baggies, Simons contends that Deputy Luke impermissibly
expanded the length of the stop when he ceased investigating the driver to approach
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and question Simons. We disagree. While the record is unclear on the exact time it took
for Deputy Luke to approach Simons, it indicates that Deputy Luke walked
immediately from the driver's side to the passenger side and asked Simons if he had
anything on his person that the officer should know about. In response to that single
question, Simons immediately revealed that he had a pipe in his underwear. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the question did not measurably extend the
length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable. See
Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 787-88 (concluding that questions directed to a passenger during a
traffic stop designed to assess possible gang membership were not part of a consensual
encounter, but also acknowledging that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated
to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop"); see also State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395,19,197 P.3d 96
(concluding that an officer's request for a canine unit, in the absence of reasonable
suspicion, did not impermissibly expand the scope or duration of a passenger's
detention, because to conclude that any deviation from the purpose of the stop
constitutes an illegal seizure "would place untenable demands on officers on the
street"). Therefore, we affirm the denial of Simons's motion to suppress.
112

Affirmed.

Carolyn B. McHugh,
Associate Presiding Judge

113

WE CONCUR:

Stephen L. Roth, Judge

Michele M. Christiansen, Judge
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ADDENDUMB
Signed Minute Entry [Denying Motion to Suppress]
(04/30/2007).
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Uiafo County^State of Utah

rM^

f

__Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
State of Utah

:
Plaintiff

:

Minute Entry

vs.

:

Date:

Kevin Sorensen,
Milo B.Simons

:

Case Number: 061404282
061404283-

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants

This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of each of the Defendants to
suppress evidence seized at the time of their arrest. For the reasons explained below the motions
are denied.
The State and both Defendants indicated to the Court that they wished to submit the
motions upon the facts as elicited during the preliminary hearing. This Court conducted the
hearing and has a transcript of the testimony.
On October 21st, 2006 at an undetermined time of day Deputy Sheriff John Rockwell
Luke was patrolling on SR 77 in Utah County with trainee officer Dan Thomas. They observed a
vehicle traveling at a steady 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. The license plate
wras reported to dispatch who informed the deputies that records available to them indicated the
vehicle to be uninsured. The officers made a traffic stop. Deputy Luke first went to the
passenger side of the vehicle where he observed Defendant Simons in the front passenger seat.
Paqe 1 of
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The trainee deputy went to the driver's door. After a brief exchange the deputies met behind the
vehicle and then Deputy Luke approached the driver, Defendant Sorensen. The reason for this
procedure was that the trainee, Deputy Thomas, was being given experience in the stop and
approach but it was determined that if a citation were to be given Deputy Luke would be the
citing officer. Deputy Luke confirmed that Mr. Sorensen could not provide proof of insurance
for the vehicle.
During this exchange Deputy Luke observed what he considered to be signs of
impairment. These signs included watery, bloodshot eyes; rapid speech and movement and
agitated, rapid body movement. The deputy felt that the unusual body language indicated
possible intoxication or impairment. He stepped back to check records on the suspects and then
re-approached the driver's side of the car. Mr. Sorensen, not in response to any question or
comment, blurted out that he was not drunk and, forcing his face toward the window, asked the
officer to look in his eyes.
From these observations the deputy concluded that he had a suspicion Mr. Sorensen was
driving while impaired. In order to continue investigation of that suspicion he directed Mr.
Sorensen to get out of the vehicle. When the door was opened he observed in plain view in the
door compartment two used corners or fragments of baggies which were consistent with the
storage and use of controlled substances. In an effort to investigate a suspicion that the
occupants of the car may have recently used drugs the training deputy was directed to stay with

Page 2 of
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Mr. Sorensen while Deputy Luke questioned Mr. Simons, who was still m the vehicle. He told
Mr. Simons he had found paraphernalia in the car and asked if he had anything on his person that
he needed to know about. Mr. Simons immediately told him that he had a pipe in his underwear.
Mr. Simons then stepped out of the vehicle at the deputy's direction. A pipe fell to the ground
out of his right pant leg. Both Defendants were then searched and methamphetamine was located
a small sack or satchel in Mr. Sorensen's left coat pocket and, also, in a small pants pocket of
Mr. Simons.
It is well established in Utah that an officer may stop a vehicle for an offense committed
in his presence. Indeed, in this case neither defendant challenges the propriety of the initial
traffic stop. A traffic stop is a level two encounter, which may be based upon reasonable
suspicion. Officers may conduct a reasonable investigation suggested by such a suspicion.
In this case Deputy Luke's initial suspicion of driving while impaired was quickly
supplemented by his observation of drug paraphernalia in plain sight when the car door was
properly opened to remove Mr. Sorensen to investigate the possible DUI charge. The baggies
were not only strongly likely to be paraphernalia, the used condition implied use of the drugs
they might have contained. That suspicion coupled with the signs of possible impairment lead to
a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car. The tactics including
a quick search of Mr. Sorensen's person and questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or
use, followed by a search of his person (perhaps a bit of an overstatement since the search

Page 3 of

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

consisted of having him step and literally shake a leg so the paraphernalia slipped down his pant
leg to be recovered by the officer) wrere reasonably suggested by his concerns. Once it was
confirmed that Mr. Simons was in possession of drug paraphernalia, arrest and a further,
concurrent search of his person was justified. Consent of either Defendant to the search was
irrelevant and this Court makes no finding on that point.
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